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SEEKING TRUTH IN NONFICTION:  QUANTITY VERSUS 
QUALITY IN PROMOTING THE “USEFUL ARTS” 
Roger Stronach* 
“True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and 
verify.  False ideas are those that we cannot.” 
 
William James, The Meaning of Truth1 
INTRODUCTION 
The story could have been made for television.2  At 4:00 a.m., a 
knock and an announcement that it was the police with information 
about a traffic accident prompted Jane Mackle to open the motel 
door.  Jane’s daughter Barbara had fallen ill during finals period at 
Emory University in Atlanta, and Jane had come to pick her up for 
winter break earlier than planned.  Barbara’s boyfriend had stopped 
by earlier, and the two feared the worst about the supposed “acci-
dent.”  But when Jane opened the door, she was confronted, not with 
a police officer, but with the barrel of a shotgun.  As she stumbled 
back, Jane was swiftly chloroformed, and Barbara was taken away, bur-
ied alive in a box in the woods, and held for ransom.  After Jane came 
to, bound and gagged alone in the hotel room, she stumbled out to 
her car, where she banged her head against the horn until somebody 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, University of 
Pennsylvania.  I owe serious gratitude to Gideon Parchomovsky for his feedback through-
out this work in progress. 
 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH:  A SEQUEL TO PRAGMATISM, at v–vi (1909), 
available at www.authorama.com/meaning-of-truth-1.html (last updated Jan. 2004). 
 2 The facts presented in this paragraph are derived from a story told in three weekly in-
stallments during May 2013 in the NORTH PORT SUN, a local Florida newspaper, to com-
memorate the 45-year anniversary of the kidnapping.  See Diana Harris, $500,000 Ransom 
Paid to Mackle Kidnapper, ENGLEWOOD SUN, May 25, 2013, at B7; Diana Harris, Mackle Kid-
napper Captured Near El Jobean, NORTH PORT SUN, June 1, 2013, at B5; Diana Harris, The 
Kidnapping of Barbara Mackle, NORTH PORT SUN, May 18, 2013, at B15.  Additional infor-
mation can be found in Michael Thomas Barry, Buried Alive – The Kidnapping of Barbara 
Jane Mackle – 1968, CRIME MAGAZINE (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.crimemagazine.com/
buried-alive-kidnapping-barbara-jane-mackle-1968, and in CATHERINE COLE & CYNTHIA 
YOUNG, TRUE CRIME:  FLORIDA – THE STATE’S MOST NOTORIOUS CRIMINAL CASES 25–36 
(2011). 
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came to help.  Eventually, after over three days underground, twenty-
year-old Barbara was rescued by the FBI. 
As it turns out, the Barbara Mackle kidnapping was, in fact, made 
into a direct-to-television movie3—but not before a high-profile legal 
dispute had pit the co-author of Barbara’s memoir, Miami Herald re-
porter Gene Miller, against a film studio that had stolen much of Mil-
ler’s factual research.4  Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. was one in a 
series of 1980s courts of appeals cases that strictly applied the 1976 
Copyright Act’s prohibition against granting copyright protection for 
ideas, concepts, principles, or discoveries.5  Although Miller held that 
copyright could not protect research itself,6 other prominent cases—
most notably Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.7 and Nash v. CBS, 
Inc.8—ruled that even the theories proposed by authors to explain 
such ideas, concepts, or factual discoveries could not be copyrighted.9  
Copyright scholars cried foul.  How could such works of nonfiction, 
they protested, be granted so little protection relative to works of fic-
tion or factual compilations?10  After all, works of nonfiction were es-
 
 3 Several movies, actually.  For an amusingly acted but nonetheless accurate (and free) mo-
tion picture account of the events, see InfamousCrimes, FBI:  The Untold Stories—Barbara 
Jane Mackle Kidnapping 1, YOUTUBE (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_fyxdcZuTdQ; InfamousCrimes, FBI:  The Untold Stories—Barbara Jane Mackle Kid-
napping 2, YOUTUBE (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AQWiW7Cuevo; 
InfamousCrimes, FBI:  The Untold Stories—Barbara Jane Mackle Kidnapping 3, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpUnO8t3-8w. 
 4 Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 5 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, il-
lustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
 6 Miller, 650 F.2d at 1367 (“[T]he verdict for plaintiff must be reversed and the cause re-
manded for a new trial because . . . the case was presented and argued to the jury on a 
false premise:  that the labor of research by an author is protected by copyright.”). 
 7 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 8 Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 9 Nash, 899 F.2d at 1542 (holding that “historical facts” are “among the ‘ideas’ and ‘discov-
eries’” that the copyright statute does not protect); Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974 (holding 
that interpretations of a historical event, even if purely investigative and not proven to be 
true, are not copyrightable as a matter of law). 
 10 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts:  A Theory for the Protection of 
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 535 (1981) (“[T]o state that facts are 
simply not copyrightable is to ignore the entire thrust of the compilation cases . . . .”); 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History:  A Comment on the Scope of Copyright 
Protection in Works of History After Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 647, 697 (1982) (“An historical account is not a directory listing of every 
known event in a given time.  Rather, it embodies the historian’s selection, from a mass of 
data, of facts which the author deems salient, and arrangement of these facts in a manner 
which supports the vision of the past the author wishes to portray. . . . Therefore, histori-
cal theories and narrations satisfy the threshold copyright requirement of originality.” 
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pecially in need of production and dissemination to the public;11 if 
anything, they should be especially incentivized by copyright protec-
tion.  And in any event, as one scholar noted, resort to statutory in-
terpretation notwithstanding, how could “[a] copyright system that 
has evolved for nearly three centuries . . . [fail to] offer, if not an in-
tricate calculus, at least the broad outlines of a coherent response to 
such an ordinary quarrel” as was posed by the parties in the Miller 
case?12  As such, these scholars devised various methods by which to 
increase the protection granted to works of nonfiction.13  The current 
system, they asserted, simply was not working. 
It has been over thirty years since the Miller case was decided, and 
copyright scholarship has moved along to brighter undertakings.  
Protection has been granted to architectural works14 and computer 
programs.15  The merits and drawbacks of recognizing an artist’s 
moral rights regarding her works have been debated.16  Copyright 
 
(footnote omitted)); Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy?  The Implications for Copyright—The 
Twelfth Annual Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 560, 593 
(1982) (“The Hoehling court, in its zeal to implement the dissemination of historical 
works, surely went further than it had to when it cautioned that ‘absent wholesale usurpa-
tion of another’s expression, claims of copyright infringement where works of history are 
at issue are rarely successful,’ and when it suggested that summary judgment for the de-
fendant might be granted so long as his work is not ‘virtually identical’ in expression to 
that of the plaintiff.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974, 980)). 
 11 See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 12 Denicola, supra note 10, at 516.  I should note that Professor Denicola similarly started his 
article with the Miller case. 
 13 See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 10, at 542 (advocating for the protection of the selection 
and arrangement of the facts used by authors of nonfiction, coupled with increased use 
of the fair use defense); Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 661–62, 665–66, 671–73 (suggesting 
that courts treat works of historical nonfiction as they do creative and artistic literary 
works, implementing a scènes à faire ideology and abstraction-filtration-comparison test in-
troduced by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 
(2d Cir. 1930)); Gorman, supra note 10, at 561–62, 579–80 (concluding that a broader 
grant of copyright, coupled with increased reliance on the fair use defense, would pro-
vide the best method for streamlining protection granted to works of nonfiction). 
 14 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012). 
 15 Id. § 102(a)(1).  Computer programs are considered “literary works.”  See, e.g., Apple 
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding 
that object code is a literary work because such “expression” includes not just words “but 
also ‘numbers, or other . . . numerical symbols or indicia’” (omission in original) (quot-
ing 17 U.S.C. § 101) (1982)). 
 16 Compare Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law, as 
presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their 
violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights 
of authors.”), with Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 
38, 47 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying “the Visual Artists Rights Act, . . . [which] . . . protects the 
‘moral rights’ of certain visual artists in the works they create, consistent with Article 6bis 
of the Berne Convention” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A) (2006)). 
1518 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
scholars have found new sources for discussion, as the mod topics in 
copyright have shifted from fair use, to functional expression and 
computer software, to comparative law and moral rights. 
Yet, the unique treatment of nonfiction within the American cop-
yright scheme remains unexplained.  Certain aspects of nonfiction 
such as facts, ideas, methods, systems, and concepts continue to be 
left unprotected;17 at the same time, nearly every aspect of a work of 
fiction garners strong protection.18  The natural consensus is still to 
approach the question from a numbers standpoint; we want more 
works of nonfiction, so we should bolster the protection that authors 
of nonfiction receive for their works.  The old adage that copyright 
protection succeeds whenever a new work is created still controls.  
The more works we can incentivize, so it seems, the better.  And as a 
result, works of nonfiction continue to appear under-protected. 
In this Comment, I hope to redefine some of the underlying as-
sumptions about the purpose of the American copyright system.  The 
United States Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries . . . .”19  The purpose of copyright, as defined by 
the Constitution, is to enhance the public body of knowledge.20  Be-
cause the Constitution makes it clear that copyright is meant to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, and because works of 
nonfiction have the primary purpose of informing the public of facts, 
theories, and ideas, such works of nonfiction can be especially “use-
ful” to this constitutional purpose, but only if they are accurate.  
Once this purpose is properly understood, an alternative method for 
measuring the utility of a work of nonfiction likewise emerges—one 
that takes into account not just the quantity of nonfiction works being 
produced, but also the quality of such works. 
This alternative—and I think more complete—view of nonfiction 
helps explain some of the intricacies of the modern copyright system, 
including our treatment of speculative works and statistical analyses.  
It also shifts some of the typical justifications and understandings at-
 
 17 See, e.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 110 
(2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the New York Mercantile Exchange’s settlement prices, 
which are used to value its customers’ positions, were not copyrightable because “enforc-
ing the copyright . . . would effectively accord protection to the idea itself”). 
 18 See, e.g., Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87–0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 25, 1989) (upholding protection for the character “Rocky,” regardless of the back-
ground story). 
 19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20 See infra text accompanying notes 24–45. 
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tributed to our system of copyright, adding another purpose to the 
idea-expression dichotomy and supplying another reason to support 
the fair use defense—the accuracy of an asserted fact can never be as-
certained if that fact is locked away from critique for upwards of a 
century.  More generally, this alternative view recalibrates the “bal-
ance” that courts have struggled to create between incentivizing new 
factual works by granting monopolies and permitting new factual 
works by leaving our limited supply of facts and ideas open for use. 
To be clear, this Comment will not attempt to draw those lines or 
strike that balance; as Judge Frank Easterbrook said in Nash v. CBS, 
“[n]either Congress nor the courts has the information that would 
allow it to determine which [rule] is best.  Both institutions must 
muddle through, using not a fixed rule[,] but a sense of the conse-
quences of moving dramatically in either direction.”21  Nor will this 
Comment debate the constitutionality of the current copyright sys-
tem.  Instead, this Comment will describe the copyright system that 
we do have through the lens of a new understanding.  How does the 
constitutional purpose driving our copyright system inform the “use-
fulness” of a particular work, and how might works of nonfiction turn 
out to be especially suitable for this purpose?  Does our copyright sys-
tem treat that measure of utility with uniformity?  Does it only incen-
tivize “useful” works, weeding out those works that are either 
preempted or detrimental, or does it incentivize all works in hopes 
that something useful is produced?  Might this explain the different 
treatment that nonfiction has received vis-à-vis other copyrightable 
works?  This Comment will primarily answer these questions with an 
eye for explanation, not proscription. 
As such, the Comment will proceed as follows:  In Part I, I will dis-
cuss the purpose given to the American copyright system in the Unit-
ed States Constitution, and how this purpose—to encourage learning 
and enhance the body of knowledge held in the public domain—is 
particularly well-served by the creation and dissemination of accurate 
works of nonfiction.  In Part II, I will discuss the problems associated 
with ensuring, via copyright protection, that such accurate works of 
nonfiction are produced.  In Part III, I will briefly illustrate the modi-
fied theory of copyright protection that results when these insights 
about nonfiction are added to the current copyright structure.  In 
Part IV, I will apply this new theory descriptively, explaining how the 
question of copyright protection for certain works such as speculative 
accounts might be answered and addressing the inconsistent case law 
 
 21 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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surrounding the copyrightability of various types of nonfiction works.  
Finally, I will summarize and conclude. 
I. THE SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL UTILITY OF A WORK OF 
NONFICTION 
Works of nonfiction hold a special position in the copyright 
scheme.  They find and explain ideas and facts, often using particular 
theories or hypotheses.22  Their purpose, to generate knowledge and 
understanding, is aligned with the purpose that the Constitution’s 
Framers assigned to the copyright system itself—to promote progress 
and “encourage[] . . . learning.”23  If a work of nonfiction fulfills its 
explanatory purpose, it adds to the public body of knowledge and is 
therefore a highly useful24 product of copyright.  If the nonfictional 
work contributes no knowledge or shrouds understanding by being 
incorrect or misleading, it damages the public body of knowledge.  
Works of nonfiction are thus unique in their ability to both fulfill and 
compromise the Constitution’s goals for the copyright system.  As 
such, they should be treated with care. 
A. The Constitution and Copyright as a Means to an End 
This Comment, of course, proceeds from the standpoint that 
American copyright law is utilitarian; temporary monopolies entice 
individuals to share their “genius”25 now, and this addition to intellec-
tual progress benefits society in the long run.26 
 
 22 Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1963) (explaining that “the three components of the intellectual 
product—the ideas, their patterning, and their ultimate expression—are generally all 
originated by the author” in artistic works, while “fact works” like “maps, news and histor-
ical accounts, [and] directories” are created with the more limited purpose of being “in-
telligible and useful to others.”). 
 23 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1790] (repealed 
1802).  
 24 Nonfiction’s usefulness for the copyright system exists independently of any definition of 
“useful Art,” which is debatable.  Here, I use “useful” to mean “serviceable for an end or 
purpose.”  See Useful, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/useful (last visited Apr. 08, 2015).  The United States Constitution assigned 
copyright with the purpose of promoting progress in the fields of science and useful arts.  
Nonfiction shares this purpose with copyright; thus, a successful work of nonfiction that 
fulfills its explanatory purpose is—by definition—a useful product of copyright. 
 25 See infra text accompanying note 28. 
 26 See, e.g., Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law:  Forgetting the Past 
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 453 (2004) (“Throughout the 
history of copyright law, supporters of the natural law property right view and supporters 
of the public benefit view have competed to control the course of copyright protection.  
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This was the standpoint taken by the Framers of the Constitution.  
From its introduction in the American colonies, copyright was meant 
to encourage intellectual progression.27  In 1783, Hugh Williamson of 
North Carolina urged the Continental Congress to form “a commit-
tee . . . to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius and 
useful arts through the United States by securing to authors or pub-
lishers of new books their property in such works . . . .”28  This lan-
guage was largely mirrored in the Constitution itself:29  Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 8 grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”30 
This rationale likewise pervaded the first Copyright Act.  Within a 
year of the Constitution’s ratification in June 1788, Congress received 
several individual requests for grants of copyright protection for vari-
ous works.31  President Washington urged Congress in his State of the 
Union that “nothing . . . [could] better deserve [their] patronage 
than the promotion of science and literature.”32  Soon thereafter, the 
first patent and copyright acts were passed—the patent act requiring 
 
In the United States, the Constitution embraced the public benefit rationale.”).  In sup-
port of that viewpoint, some scholars have pointed to the Intellectual Property Clause’s 
unique structure and wording within Section 8 of Article I; they view “[t]he Framers’ 
choice not to adopt the plenary proposals [forwarded by Madison and Pinckney], but ra-
ther to subject their exercise to specific ends . . . [as evidence] that the Progress Clause 
was added as a limitation.”  Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:  
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 
1777 (2006).  Others more tamely recognize that “[t]he objective of the copyright system 
is to create a social and economic climate which will encourage the creation and dissemi-
nation of [certain] material.”  Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 35 
(1983).  Either way, these steps toward a national copyright scheme all indicate that copy-
right exists as a tool with the specific purpose of benefiting the public body of knowledge. 
 27 Indeed, this utilitarian view of copyright likely had its roots in England, where upon con-
sidering a bill supported by copyists to “change the term of copyright for all books, old 
and new, to twenty-one years” from a term of fourteen years, “one anonymous pamphlet-
eer said:  ‘I see no Reason for granting a further Term now . . . it will be a great Cramp to 
Trade[] [and] a Discouragement to Learning . . . .”  Tyler T. Ochoa and Mark Rose, The 
Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675, 
682 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 28 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 19 (1994), (quoting 24 J. CONTINENTAL 
CONG. 180 (1783)) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://digital-law-
online.info/patry/. 
 29 Arguably, “cherishing genius” could be read similarly to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,” but the latter is certainly more clearly focused on public benefit than 
private natural property rights. 
 30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 31 See PATRY, supra note 28. 
 32 Id. (quoting S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 93–94 (1790)). 
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full disclosure of methods and an ex ante screening for novelty,33 and 
the preamble of the copyright act noting that the copyright act pref-
aced by a preamble noting that copyrights existed “for the encour-
agement of learning.”34 
Some theorists have argued that the purpose of the copyright sys-
tem is to protect the “natural right” that a person has to her own in-
tellectual creations.35  Indeed, James Madison may have acknowl-
edged such a right in Federalist No. 43 when he noted that “[t]he 
public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individu-
als.”36  But while such a viewpoint was acknowledged at the time the 
Framers first conceived of the copyright and patent systems, it was not 
the primary impetus driving the Framers to establish basic intellectual 
property protection.37  In a letter to Thomas Jefferson addressing Jef-
ferson’s contention that “the benefit even of limited monopolies is 
too doubtful to be opposed to . . . their . . . suppression,”38 James 
Madison asserted that while “Monopolies . . . are justly classed among 
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government . . . as encouragements to 
literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are . . . too valuable to 
be wholly renounced . . . .”39  The focus of the federal copyright sys-
tem was seen as different from some of the systems already being 
used by the colonies.40  Indeed, the addition of a preamble to the be-
 
 33 Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Patent Act of 1790] (repealed 
1793). 
 34 Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23. 
 35 This viewpoint is typically rooted, at least in some sense, in John Locke’s Labor Theory, 
whereby one’s creations become one’s property.  A modern interpretation is that regard-
less of whether a natural property right was used by the Framers to justify the copyright 
system, such a natural right theory could be implemented to justify intellectual property 
without forgetting about “the rights of the public as well as with the rights of those whose 
labors create intellectual products.”  Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 
(1993).  This modern interpretation links copyright with the First Amendment right to 
free expression.  See id. at 1537–38. 
 36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 37 Not only do period documents reject the notion of a natural property right, but so did 
the early courts.  See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 591 (1834) (“That a 
man is entitled to the fruits of his own labours must be admitted; but he can enjoy them 
only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property which regulate society, 
and which define the rights of things in general.”). 
 38 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 443 (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney eds., Digital Edition 
2015), available at http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/TSJN-01-13-02-0335. 
 39 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 21 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1958). 
 40 As has been noted by William Patry, “the federal statute . . . seems to have appealed to a 
different class of authors than the colonial statutes.  Under the previous regime of state 
laws, literary and musical works constituted the bulk of registrations.  By contrast, under 
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ginning of the Intellectual Property Clause was unusual among other 
Article I, Section 8 powers,41 and was likely considered an ideological 
limitation on Congress’s power.42  Moreover, the first copyright act 
actually encouraged the piracy of foreign works—seemingly com-
pletely renouncing a “natural right.”43  So while the Framers acknowl-
edged an individual’s claim to her intellectual property, there was no 
universal right to such property.  Rather, any property protection that 
was granted via copyright was a privilege bestowed as a means to an 
end.44  This purpose still drives the copyright system today.45 
 
at least the early years of the federal statute, practical or commercially useful books, such 
as works of instruction, textbooks, manuals, geographical atlases, and commercial direc-
tories, constituted the bulk of the registrations.”  PATRY, supra note 28, at 34. 
 41 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:  Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 
1775 (2006).  The Clause received special attention from Framers who chose “not to 
adopt the plenary proposals [forwarded by Madison and Pinckney], but rather to subject 
their exercise to specific ends.”  Id. at 1777. 
 42 The preamble eschewed proposals forwarded by nationalists like Madison and Pinckney.  
Id. at 1777.  Cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Remarkable—and Irrational—Disparity Between 
the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE SOC’Y 233, 244 
(2001) (“Early on in its history, the grant of power was frequently thought to reside in the 
phrase ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ with the phrase ‘by securing 
for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries’ serving as a specific limitation on the general grant of power to only the 
specific mode of patents and copyrights.  In more recent times, the interpretation has 
tended to be reversed . . . .”).  This viewpoint is certainly plausible; the court in Wilson v. 
Rousseau, for example, notes with clarity:  “Congress shall have power.  What power?  
Power to promote the progress of science and useful arts.  How?  By securing the exclu-
sive right of property in writings and discoveries.  To whom?  To authors and inventors.  
For how long?  For limited times.”  Wilson v. Rousseau, 30 F. Cas. 162, 166 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 
1845).  But no matter whether the first or the second half of the Intellectual Property 
Clause is viewed as operative, the clause “is in fact a substantive grant of power to Con-
gress, and the introductory portion thereof may not be read out of it and rendered mean-
ingless.” Walterscheid, supra at 248. 
 43 See Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23, § 5 (“[N]othing in this act shall be construed to 
extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the Unit-
ed States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person 
not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the 
United States.”).  Indeed, this lack of enforcement against piracy lasted until 1891.  
PATRY, supra note 28, at 33. 
 44 Accord Ochoa & Rose, supra note 27, at 692; see also COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS:  LAWS 
PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 8 (1973) (cited by 
PATRY, supra note 28, at 21 n.64) (“As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civ-
ilization, and the advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of in-
genious persons in the various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement such 
persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must consist in 
the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such secu-
rity is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a 
man’s own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind:  Therefore, to encour-
age the publication of literary productions, honorary and beneficial to the public . . . .” 
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B. The Special Ability of Works of Nonfiction to Uphold This Purpose 
Given that the Framers saw copyright as a means by which to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts through the “encour-
agement of learning,” works of nonfiction are uniquely positioned to 
fulfill the copyright system’s constitutional purpose.  Said copyright 
scholar Robert Gorman, “[t]he photographs of [a] model, although 
reproductions of a ‘fact,’ partake of an artistic conception; the pho-
tographs of the medical operation partake more of a representation 
of facts within the public domain, the free dissemination of which is 
of greater significance to society.”46  Gorman was implying a distinc-
tion necessarily left undefined in the Constitution’s copyright 
scheme—that some works comprise “science” or “useful arts” while 
some do not. 
Today, as copyright has expanded to cover more and more subject 
matters, its connection to the progress of science and useful arts has 
become increasingly tenuous.47  Within this large body of copyrighta-
 
(footnote omitted)).  This suggests that the acknowledgement of such property rights was 
a means to an end. 
 45 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The copyright law, like the patent stat-
utes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Of course, the broad expansion of the copyright system and introduction of 
new doctrines such as VARA suggest that it may no longer be the only justification for 
copyright. 
 46 Gorman, supra note 22, at 1599–1600. 
 47 On the one hand, the expansion of copyright may just reflect the expansion of methods 
by which copyrightable material can be delivered.  Said Congress in discussing the 1976 
Act,  
During the past half century a wide range of new techniques for capturing and com-
municating printed matter, visual images, and recorded sounds have come into use, 
and the increasing use of information storage and retrieval devices, communications 
satellites, and laser technology promises even greater changes in the near future.  
The technical advances have generated new industries and new methods for the re-
production and dissemination of copyrighted works, and the business relations be-
tween authors and users have evolved new patterns. 
  H.R. REP. No. 94–1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660.  In this 
sense, technologies increasingly made those entities originally intended for copyright—
books, information, charts, maps—available via an increasing number of devices. 
   But on the other hand, this was only one of two of Congress’s reasons for expanding 
copyright protection:  “Scientific discoveries and technological developments have made 
possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before . . . [i]n other cases, 
such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment was 
deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable works.”  Id. at 5664.  
Thus, many new copyrightable subject matters have been introduced for no reason other 
than to expand the body of copyrightable works, perhaps beyond the bounds of those 
that “promote the progress of science and useful arts.”  Indeed, pornographic films regu-
larly attain copyright protection, and while they have utility in the hedonic, Benthamian 
sense, they hardly encourage learning. 
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ble works, works of nonfiction more clearly stand out as the most 
“useful” “works of genius” that can be given to the public body of 
knowledge.  Creative works such as a painting or sculpture might in-
duce reflection, encourage study, or refine thought—perhaps en-
couraging learning as a side effect.  Even a blockbuster motion pic-
ture can generate thought.48  But these influences only indirectly 
contribute to “learning,” if at all.  By contrast, works of nonfiction 
take the Constitution’s goals as their own.  A work of nonfiction seeks 
literally to progress our understanding of facts, ideas, and discoveries, 
or to encourage learning by making those facts and ideas easier to 
digest.  So while the constitutional utility49 of a creative work is typical-
ly just peripheral, the utility of a work of nonfiction is obvious. 
Unfortunately, with great value comes great risk.50  Just as works of 
nonfiction have the greatest potential to increase public knowledge 
and understanding, they also have the ability to mislead or taint pub-
lic knowledge if they are incorrect.  Even subtle misinterpretations 
can have lasting effects.51  So while works of nonfiction can be ex-
 
   Whatever Congress’s motives, many courts such as the Supreme Court in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co. have shirked this issue entirely by saying that the courts are 
not involved in judging what is or is not a proper subject for copyright protection in the 
first place—no matter what mode by which they are being displayed or delivered.  188 
U.S. 239, 251 (1903).  While a further discussion would be fun, it is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
 48 See, e.g., Nico Lang, 25 Movies That Will Change Your Life (Vol. 1), THOUGHT CATALOG 
(June 19, 2013), http://thoughtcatalog.com/nico-lang/2013/06/25-movies-that-will-
change-your-life-vol-1/; brantwilson, 39 Mind Blowing Videos for Your Inspiration, 
DZINEBLOG (Jan. 13, 2011), http://dzineblog.com/2011/01/39-mind-blowing-videos-for-
your-inspiration.html; Movies That Changed My Life, TUMBLR, http://movies-that-changed-
my-life.tumblr.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).  Of course, nonfiction documentaries 
can do the same.  See Sam Austin, 10 Mind Blowing Documentaries, LIVE LEARN EVOLVE 
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://livelearnevolve.com/10-mind-blowing-documentaries/. 
 49 See Useful supra note 24; here, utility measures how significantly a particular work forwards 
the goal of the copyright system. 
 50 Of course, with great risk comes great reward—but if we had the chance to mitigate risk 
without reducing reward, we would take it. 
 51 See, e.g., countrycat, Lies My Alabama History Book Told Me—Part 1 “Slavery as Social Security”, 
LEFT IN ALABAMA (Jan. 24, 2011, 6:41 PM), http://www.leftinalabama.com/
diary/7621/lies-my-alabama-history-book-told-me-part-1-slavery-as-social-security (quoting 
CHARLES GRAYSON SUMMERSELL, ALABAMA:  HISTORY FOR SCHOOLS 229 (1960)).  I should 
note that the blog post, Lies My Alabama History Book Told Me is likely influenced by JAMES 
W. LOEWEN, LIES MY TEACHER TOLD ME:  EVERYTHING YOUR AMERICAN HISTORY 
TEXTBOOK GOT WRONG (1995).  In one passage of ALABAMA:  HISTORY FOR SCHOOLS, as 
recorded by countrycat, Summersell writes:  “The master supervised both the driver and 
the overseer.   Occasionally, a master had a pair of binoculars and watched distant work-
ers from the upper story of his plantation house.  Thus the stage was set for some lazy 
field hand who went to sleep beside his job to get the surprise of his life from the master 
who had been watching him with the field glasses!”  Presumably, Summersell’s book was 
copyrighted.  But how much of it is protected?  Is the “fact” that slave drivers and overseers 
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tremely useful, they—more so than creative works—can also be de-
structive.  As such, our copyright system must be cognizant about the 
true utility of the factual works it protects.  If treated properly, works 
of nonfiction have a special ability to fulfill the task assigned to the 
American copyright system by the Constitution. 
C. Accuracy as a Measure of a Nonfiction Work’s Success 
The easiest interpretation of copyright’s utility is to assume that as 
more copyrightable works are produced, the public benefit increas-
es.52  But when applied to works of nonfiction—arguably the most 
important works to the public good53—this traditional rationale falls 
short of fully explaining what the “public good” requires.  Unlike cre-
ative works, which generally seek to entertain, provoke, or amuse ra-
ther than to inform, these works of nonfiction only really contribute 
to the public good if they are correct.  A creative work that falls flat 
does not detriment the body of public works, whereas an “informa-
tive” factual work that turns out to be incorrect is misleading and 
counterproductive, providing faulty foundations for future works or 
public understanding.  Measuring the success of the copyright system 
in incentivizing works of nonfiction therefore requires something 
aside from “more is better.” 
 
were supervised by a master protected?  The “idea” that slaves were just lazy field hands?  
How about the “theory” that a lazy field hand would receive “the surprise of his life” if he 
fell asleep?  Which of these “facts,” “ideas,” and “theories” should be protected by copy-
right?  Are any of them “useful” contributions to the public body of knowledge?  Does it 
matter?  You bet it does.  The Summersells were well-respected in Alabama.  See, e.g., Greg 
Retsinas, “Community Treasure” Frances Summersell Dies, TUSCALOOSANEWS.COM (Jan. 17, 
2003, 03:30 AM), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20030117/NEWS/301170340.  
Summersell’s book was likely well-respected too.  Thanks to Sara Arrow, Penn Law, J.D. 
2015, for pointing me to Loewen’s book. 
 52 With respect to our modern focus on artistic and creative works, this rationale makes 
sense.  Since the “utility” we gain from artistic works is largely rooted in those works’ en-
tertainment value, such utility increases as more works are created.  An unentertaining 
work does not deplete the body of entertaining works; it simply does not contribute 
much. 
 53 This assumes the societal preference for “learning” that was attributed by the Constitu-
tion.  Of course, many individuals would find more entertainment value in watching a 
blockbuster movie than they would in reading a groundbreaking article.  Likewise, Amer-
ican society as a whole may prefer the blockbuster movie because it generates more reve-
nue and worldwide cultural prestige than an article.  But to parse out individual prefer-
ences such as this is an exercise in behavioral economics, and again approaches the 
Benthamian hedonics that lie beyond the scope of this article.  And in any event, such 
economic considerations are foreclosed here since we agreed to the goals expressed in 
the Constitution when we ratified it.  In the aggregate, informational works of fact are 
more “useful” to realizing the goals stated in the Constitution than are artistic and crea-
tive works. 
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Another reason that works of nonfiction must be accurate is that 
they are not standalone.  The societal “learning”54 that our Framers 
wanted copyright to enhance should require not just breadth of 
knowledge, but also depth of understanding.  Works of nonfiction cer-
tainly work to expand our breadth of knowledge by introducing facts, 
ideas, and discoveries, but at the same time, their aim is to enable our 
understanding of those facts and discoveries through theory, hypoth-
esis, and explanation.  Intellectual progression naturally follows a 
path; works of nonfiction build upon the insights provided by previ-
ous factual works.  Increased but inaccurate information is not use-
ful.55  Of course, as the number of potential theories increases, the 
likelihood that any one of those theories propounds the correct in-
terpretation of a set of facts also goes up.56  But how could we ever 
figure out which of a multitude of theories is correct?  In the end, the 
utility that the public derives from certain protected works therefore 
stems not just from the quantity of the production that is induced, but 
also from the quality of those particular works.  And the production of 
more works of nonfiction is not useful unless we can identify the accu-
rate information resulting from that production.  This begs the ques-
tion—given that nonfiction is simultaneously useful and dangerous, 
can the copyright system differentiate the various works of nonfiction 
by accuracy?  And if so, has it? 
II. TESTING THE UTILITY OF A WORK OF NONFICTION 
A. A Comparison of the Patent and Copyright Systems 
If the purpose of the copyright system is the encouragement of 
learning, the means is through incentivizing the progress of science 
and useful arts, and the measure of success—at least for a work of 
nonfiction—partially relies on that work’s accuracy then the copy-
right system should aim to incentivize factual works that are accurate.  
If this is the case, why is accuracy not a prerequisite for copyright pro-
tection like it is for patent protection?  The answer is that while the 
 
 54 Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23. 
 55 For example, one well-written and accurate history of Europe is more beneficial to the 
public body of knowledge than ten “unique” but poorly researched and implausible ac-
counts. 
 56 Aristotle said that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”  But his “whole” re-
quired more than sheer numbers; it required synergy.  Of course, sometimes even syner-
gies just do not occur as one might expect.  For centuries, individual clues pointed to a 
heliocentric view of the solar system.  But only after Copernicus finally did the math did 
the viewpoint become more widely studied and eventually accepted. 
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utility of patentable works can easily be tested ex ante, the utility of 
copyrightable works cannot.57 
Congress first exercised its Section 8, Clause 8 power when it es-
tablished a patent system in the Act of April 10, 1790.58  The act 
sought to protect any “invented or discovered . . . useful art, manufac-
ture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not be-
fore known or used . . . .”59  A month later, it established the copy-
right system in the Act of May 21, 1790.  This was “[a]n act for the 
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, 
and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the 
times therein mentioned.”60  The temporal proximity of the acts indi-
cates a similarity of purpose.  Both systems clearly endorsed “pro-
gress”—patents through the protection of inventions and discoveries 
“not before known or used” and copyrights through “maps, charts, 
and books” that “encourage[] . . . learning.”61  But the acts’ proximity 
also suggests that any differences in design between the two were in-
tentional.62 
 
 57 The idea that patent law and copyright law should be compared is not without its skep-
tics.  Some theorists vehemently assert that the patent and copyright systems should not 
be considered in tandem.  See, e.g., Olson, supra note 26, at 34 (“The limited nature of 
copyright protection . . . requires an emphatic rejection of any comparison with pa-
tents . . . .”).  Of course, this view ignores the reality that the courts do oftentimes consid-
er the copyright and patent systems together.  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (“One of the fundamental purposes behind 
the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity 
in the realm of intellectual property.”).  But more importantly, there are in fact reasons 
that the systems should be compared. 
   Ultimately, the primary reason to compare the copyright and patent systems is to 
provide context.  Since the shared purpose of the patent and copyright systems in the 
United States is to encourage learning and promote the progress of science and useful 
arts, comparing the two systems sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of copyright 
as a tool to incentivize progress.  Within the specific context of this Comment, a cursory 
examination of the patent system will provide:  (1) an understanding that the Framers 
clearly established patents and copyrights with the purpose of expanding the public body 
of knowledge through incentivizing the creation of useful works; (2) the reasons why fac-
tual works are therefore so instrumental to the copyright system; and (3) the inherent 
limitations of the copyright system in measuring utility. 
 58 Patent Act of 1790, supra note 33. 
 59 Id. at 16. 
 60 Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23, at 125. 
 61 Of course, there are a number of clauses in the Constitution that contain multiple pow-
ers.  But the Intellectual Property Clause is different because no single portion of the 
clause has been exclusively developed by a specific branch of the intellectual property sys-
tem; design patents, for example, arguably protect useful arts while copyright protection 
might cover a scientific article. 
 62 Since the Patent Act of 1790 and Copyright Act of 1790 were only passed a month apart 
from each other, and seemingly in direct response to a singular directive from President 
Washington that the “promotion of science and literature” was a cause that “deserve[d 
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As such, juxtaposing and comparing the two systems reveals how 
the different types of works each system targets require different 
measures of utility. 
Though the copyright and patent systems were always similar in 
purpose, they were established with obvious functional differences.63  
The Patent Act, which applied narrowly to inventions, discoveries, or 
improvements that were “not before known or used,” established a 
rigorous process by which to attain protection,64 creating from the 
outset many of the requirements that make up the modern patent 
system—utility, novelty, and an assurance that all knowledge would 
be contributed to the public domain via “best methods” disclosure.65  
Notably, the Patent Act was passed first.  The features it contained 
were the tools the Founding Fathers initially looked to in providing a 
public benefit through the progress of science and useful arts.  By 
contrast, the copyright system never demanded such rigorous proof 
of utility.  The first Copyright Act, while requiring announcement 
and registration66 of the work by the author seeking the copyright 
protection, did not require any explanation as to the principles or 
methods being used in the work and therefore did not contain a 
method by which to test for usefulness or novelty.  This exclusion 
could not have been arbitrary.  While a patentable object—a cork-
screw, for example, or a vaccine—can be observed and judged for its 
qualities, many abstract theories or ideas, while capable of being de-
scribed, cannot be tested ex ante.67  Presumably, the Framers foresaw 
 
their] patronage,” PATRY, supra note 28, at 28 (citing S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 93–
94 (1790)), the differences between the two were presumably intentional. 
 63 Today, the patent and copyright systems are even more divergent.  A patent is difficult to 
attain while a copyright adheres almost automatically; a patent for an object can only be 
granted to one person while identical copyrighted items can be individually created; a pa-
tent lasts twenty years while a copyright can last six times as long; a patent owner must ful-
ly disclose her technology while a copyright owner bears no burden to disclose her ide-
as—the differences continue. 
 64 See Patent Act of 1790, supra note 33, at § 2 (requiring submission of “explanations and 
models” that were “so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery, from 
other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person, 
skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest 
connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have the 
full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent-term . . . .”). 
 65 35 U.S.C. § 101–12 (2012).  These also include the concept of the “PHOSITA” (person 
having ordinary skill in the art).  Id. § 103. 
 66 The “author or proprietor shall, within two months from the date [of registration with 
the clerk of court], cause a copy of the said record [including the title of the work] to be 
published in one or more of the newspapers printed in the United States, for the space of 
four weeks.” Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23, § 3. 
 67 Of course, nowadays, many copyrightable works have no utility whatsoever in the strict 
sense of the word, and bear no relation to any facts, theories, or ideas.  Indeed, this de-
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this key distinction between the “science” and “literature” for which 
George Washington urged support. 
While the Framers were not arbitrary in their construction of the 
early copyright system, they nonetheless failed to articulate any rules 
regarding those works of literature whose “utility” was arguably tied to 
scientific or theoretical accuracy.  No provision in the first Copyright 
Act or any act thereafter directly addressed the treatment of theories, 
hypotheses, and facts—arguably bits of “science”—whose develop-
ment or discovery were recorded in an otherwise copyrightable writ-
ing.  No provision addressed the copyrightability of works that pur-
ported, for example, to describe history or detail a new branch of 
physiology.  Certainly, the patent and copyright systems were consid-
ered equally important to the progress of science and the useful arts; 
both systems provided a term of fourteen years.68  But given that the 
copyright system should theoretically incentivize accurate factual 
works, its lack of a test for such accuracy leaves room for enfeeble-
ment of copyright as a purpose-driven system. 
B. Determining Accuracy Through Discussion, Verification, and Refutation 
In fact, the Framers probably could not have devised a test for ac-
curacy or utility of a work seeking copyright protection even if they 
wanted to.  Individuals in a government office cannot be tasked with 
adjudging what is and is not factually “true,” especially when it comes 
to novel or evolving topics of study.69  Indeed, this is the very problem 
 
velopment has encouraged some scholars to draw a fundamental distinction between the 
utilitarian purposes of the patent and copyright systems.  See, e.g., Lateef Mtima, So Dark 
the Con(tu) of Man:  The Quest for a Software Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 69 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 23, 38 (2007) (“Whereas significant utilitarian achievement and advancement is 
the goal of the patent law, the social utility objectives of the copyright law are quite dif-
ferent.  To begin with, unlike patent protection, copyright protection is not dependent 
upon the demonstration of any ‘revolutionary advance.’” (citation omitted)).  Of course, 
this viewpoint discounts two things:  The modern evolution of the copyright system be-
yond its original bounds, and the inability of the copyright system to test for such a “revo-
lutionary advance.” 
 68 Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23, § 1; Patent Act of 1790, supra note 33, at § 1.  An 
author’s and inventor’s labors “may be equally beneficial to society; and in their respec-
tive spheres, they may be alike distinguished for mental vigour.  Does the common law 
give a perpetual right to the author, and withhold it from the inventor?  And yet it has 
never been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any property in his 
invention, after he shall have sold it publicly.”  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 
591 (1834).  The Supreme Court Justices who decided Wheaton v. Peters would be aston-
ished at the disparate courses of the patent and copyright systems. 
 69 Indeed, society may not itself be able to determine an ultimate truth.  Says Professor Jane 
C. Ginsburg, even if an “historical truth . . . exists, it can never be discovered, because the 
same diversity of understanding, approach, and predilection which makes every personal-
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with granting copyright protection to facts or ideas—entities that are 
strictly barred from copyright protection in the United States.70  The 
only way that the accuracy or “truth” of a particular theory or exposi-
tion can be tested is through questioning, testing, discourse, and 
eventual consensus.  Said William James in The Meaning of Truth, 
“[t]rue ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, 
and verify.  False ideas are those that we cannot.”71 
Therefore, if we want to promote the progress of science and use-
ful arts by incentivizing an accretion of accurate knowledge, we want 
to incentivize the verification, corroboration, and validation that help 
turn good ideas into facts and the enquiry, discourse, and refutation 
that weed out the false ideas too.  We also want to incentivize contin-
ued discussion of those facts that are already accepted as “true” in 
recognition that an even better viewpoint may eventually come along.  
In any event, we want to incentivize the discourse needed to deter-
mine the veracity of a purported fact.  Only then will the ideas for-
warded in a work of nonfiction become “useful” additions to the pub-
lic body of knowledge. 
This need for discourse explains why facts, ideas, and factual ac-
counts72 must not be foreclosed from adoption or discussion by way of 
copyright protection.  Such facts and ideas must be left open so as to 
encourage the generation of opinions, debate, and eventual consen-
sus regarding a particular purported fact or idea.73  Only once that 
 
ity unique precludes a unity of historical interpretation.”  Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 658.  
But outside of historical interpretation, certain nonfiction topics do boil down to objective 
truths.  And in any event, the existence of the platonic fact precept has nothing to do 
with whether works should or should not be discussed, refuted, or verified.  Even if an ob-
jective truth could never be declared, that should not stop society from seeking such a 
truth for itself.  And even if each person in society were to come to a different conclusion 
as to what the “truth” regarding a particular matter actually was, those individuals would 
still benefit from increased acuity of explanation and accuracy in interpretation of facts.  
The point is simple:  Society, whether for itself or for the greater good, must bear the re-
sponsibility of determining what is “true”—not the courts. 
 70 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012), commonly referred to as the “idea-expression dichotomy.”  See 
infra note 89. 
 71 JAMES,  supra note 1. 
 72 By “factual account” I do not mean the expression itself, which is perhaps protectable, 
but the specific interpretation of a fact.  For example, an historical biography that pre-
sents a new story about a past figure might protect the literal telling of the story, but can-
not protect the content of the story itself.  That content is a factual account which other 
authors may want to adopt, research, refute, or verify.  It cannot be foreclosed from such 
use. 
 73 One other scholar has reached this conclusion.  In Copyright Protection for the Collection and 
Representation of Facts, Robert Gorman noted that “[i]n theory, it might well be possible to 
give a monopoly over ideas; after all, the great creative contribution of the historian may 
be his theory of history and not so much the felicity of his style in expounding it.  But our 
 
1532 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
consensus has been reached can a fact, theory, or account become 
more or less “true” or “untrue.”  In the spirit of the Constitution, only 
society itself can determine what truths to follow.  Facts, purported 
facts, and purportedly factual accounts cannot be copyrightable.  
Otherwise, truths are never discovered, accuracy is never determined, 
and the progress of science and useful arts stalls. 
III. THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM THAT RESULTS:  AN ILLUSTRATION 
At the most fundamental level, the Framers intended the copy-
right system to be a means by which to expand the public body of 
knowledge.  Described as “an Act for the encouragement of learn-
ing,” the first copyright statute set out to “promote the progress of 
science and useful arts” alongside patents by incentivizing the pro-
duction of works by those scholars, explorers, theorists, or other au-
thors who might have something to contribute to the public good.74  
Explanatory works of nonfiction, the earliest works that Congress de-
clared copyrightable,75 can be especially useful in promoting the pro-
gress of science and useful arts if the information claimed in such 
works is accurate.  But unlike a patentable invention, the utility—or 
the accuracy—of a work of nonfiction cannot be tested; it can only be 
declared more or less true after being thoroughly discussed and stud-
ied by others.  Consequently, the facts, purported facts, theories of 
fact, and ideas presented in such works cannot be foreclosed from 
such discussion by a grant of copyright protection. 
In his lecture Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, Robert 
Gorman likened the individual pieces of knowledge contributed by 
scientists, theorists, and other authors of nonfiction to the bricks that 
make up a building.  “To promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts in the long run,” said Gorman, “we [initially] permit the 
author for a limited time . . . to stop others from copying or embel-
lishing upon his work.” 76  Eventually, however, “[w]e permit, indeed 
encourage, later authors and artists to build upon the copyrighted 
works of their predecessors, while holding out the threat that if they 
 
Constitution has granted Congress the power to protect ‘writings’ only.  And even in the 
absence of constitutional stricture, it would no doubt be thought more beneficial to the 
arts and sciences to free ‘ideas’ for criticism, elaboration, improvement, or application by 
others; this is what has been done in England.” Gorman, supra note 22, at 1582–83.  
Gorman notes that part of the “public interest” is “to guarantee the accuracy of recorded 
facts by encouraging verification of earlier fact works.” Id. at 1585. 
 74 Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Gorman, supra note 10, at 560. 
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use too many such ‘bricks’ in their building they may be branded in-
fringers.”77 
Consider the facts or information at an author or artist’s disposal 
to be the “bricks” and the specific ideas or theories that binds those 
“bricks” together to be the mortar.  Within this world of bricks and 
mortar, both the patent and copyright systems clearly incentivize the 
expansion and creation of new structures.  But when it comes to en-
suring structural integrity, the systems’ methods diverge entirely.  The 
patent system tests for the structural soundness of its bricks by requir-
ing proof of “usefulness” and “novelty” of patented objects ex ante.  
Its buildings must pass inspection, by satisfying strict construction 
codes, before they can be occupied.  The bricks must be able to bear 
a certain weight, the mortar must be able to hold the bricks together 
sufficiently, and the building itself must be designed in a certain way 
so as to be usefully different from any building that has come before 
it.  By contrast, the copyright system has no reliable method by which 
to test the integrity of ideas, hypotheses, theories, or purported facts.  
No code can readily determine ex ante whether the bricks are strong 
enough, whether the mortar is cohesive enough, or whether the 
building is designed properly.  A copyright itself cannot signal to so-
ciety that the work necessarily advances the progress of science or 
useful arts.78 
Elementary as it is, the bricks and mortar analogy properly de-
scribes the intermediate position of works of nonfiction within the 
modern intellectual property scheme.  On one end of the spectrum 
are works of fiction.  Although fiction does not constitute the core 
body of works targeted by the Constitution, they produce almost no 
risk to the public body of knowledge.  Stories can never be “wrong” 
because they rest on their own invented facts, a piece of music cannot 
collapse upon untrue notes, and paintings—even if poorly executed 
or not depicting any particular scene at all—cannot be the product of 
“incorrect” brush strokes.  Because there probably is at least some 
utility to fictional works,79 we therefore incentivize them fully with 
complete copyright protection.  And indeed, such works continue to 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Of course, a work need not already be copyrighted to be protected. 
 79 There is the obvious question of whether works of fiction serve the constitutional purpose 
at all.  But here, we would have to quibble over the definition of “useful.”  It is entirely 
plausible that numerous works of fiction find their utility in enriching our imaginations, 
and thus, I am not prepared to take that position.  Likely, works of fiction have at least 
some utility.  But relative to works of nonfiction, whose theories and hypotheses, if not 
correct, are entirely un-useful, works of fiction simply do not present the same issues. 
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grow and expand without too much outcry.80  On the other end of 
the spectrum are patentable works.  Patentable works generally ex-
pand scientific understanding.  And although patented works differ 
from works of fiction in that they have the capacity to mislead the 
public, there is little risk of this happening in practice.  The patent 
system imposes a set of criteria that must be satisfied before protec-
tion is granted.  This is not a difficult undertaking when the things 
being examined are capable of being tested. 
Lying squarely in between are works of nonfiction.  Like patents, 
works of nonfiction must be correct to be useful.  But unlike patents, 
and more like fiction, the “truth” or veracity of an asserted piece of 
nonfiction cannot always be tested ex ante.  It is for this reason that 
the use of facts, hypotheses, and theories by all authors seeking to 
add to or improve any particular topic must be permitted to allow for 
a work’s accuracy to be determined.  If we want to construct a “build-
ing” of knowledge for a particular field of study, we must allow differ-
ent authors and artists to take a crack at the facts so that later authors 
and artists can add their bricks onto the ones they think are the most 
precisely laid. 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE APPLICATIONS:  HOW A UTILITARIAN MEASURE OF 
NONFICTION EXPLAINS INTRICACIES OF THE MODERN AMERICAN 
COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
A utilitarian measure of nonfiction that takes into account not on-
ly the volume of factual works, but also the quality of such works, re-
sults naturally from copyright’s endowed utilitarian purpose.  But our 
copyright system has changed since its 1790 inception.81  Works of 
 
 80 Of course, there has been some outcry.  See, e.g., Dallon, supra note 26, at 436–37 (argu-
ing that the modern expansion of the copyright term limit, and especially the 1998 Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, clearly violates the public interest purpose of copy-
right); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution:  A Historical 
Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 19–20 (2001) (asserting that even a moderate 
interpretation of Congress’s power to expand the copyright term would not permit the 
twenty-year extension provided for by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).  
But see Craig W. Dallon, Original Intent and the Copyright Clause:  Eldred v. Ashcroft Gets It 
Right, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307, 309, 357–59 (2006) (concluding that, ultimately, the Su-
preme Court was correct in holding that Congress had the ability to pass the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 81 Discussing the expansion of the copyright system is beyond the scope of this comment.  
Suffice it to say that where copyright once protected useful maps, charts, and books, it 
now protects music, artwork, sculpture, architectural design, and other aesthetic crea-
tions.  Creativity has become increasingly engrained as part of our conception of personal 
“property,” and the copyright system reflects that shift not only in the breadth of works it 
protects, but also in the strength of the protection afforded to those works.  Indeed, the 
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nonfiction are now a small part of a vast expanse of copyrightable 
subject matter,82 and the protections granted to such factual works 
have grown less uniform.83  At the most general level, it is easy to un-
derstand why protection for nonfiction has become relatively less 
forceful as compared to other copyrightable works:  For the most 
part, artistic and creative works—which have been increasingly grant-
ed copyright protection over the past century84—do not have the 
same ability to promote the progress of science and useful arts as 
works of nonfiction, and do not require discussion and verification to 
ensure accuracy.85  But even among factual works, differences in 
scope of protection exist.86  Given that the modern copyright system 
has expanded so far beyond its original bounds, can a utilitarian pur-
pose still explain our treatment of various copyrightable works, par-
ticularly nonfiction? 
The short answer is yes.  A fair use defense, for example, now ex-
plicitly permits “criticism, comment, . . . reporting, teaching . . . , 
scholarship or research” by allowing scholars to use a portion of a 
preexisting work for one of those purposes.87  And many of our sys-
 
Copyright Act allows for damages that may exceed the true economic harm caused by an 
infringer!  In this sense, an objective observer might conclude that the American system 
views copyright as even more important than patents, infringement of which will not re-
sult in such overcompensation to the patent holder.  See generally Rachel L. Emsley, Note, 
Copying Copyright’s Willful Infringement Standard:  A Comparison of Enhanced Damages in Pa-
tent Law and Copyright Law, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 157, 172–73 (2008). 
 82 As the harbinger for copyright protection gradually shifted from maps, charts, and books, 
Copyright Act of 1790, to “works of an author,” Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60–349, 
60th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976), to “original,” Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), and “creative,” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), works, the spectrum of copyrightable materials has 
likewise broadened.  Whereas the American copyright system originally protected maps, 
charts, and books for a period of 14 years, Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23, the mod-
ern system protects—and this is an open list—“(1) literary works; (2) musical works [and 
lyrics]; (3) dramatic works [and] accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(2012), for, generally, the rest of the author’s life plus seventy years after death.  Id. § 302. 
 83 See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 22, at 1570 (discussing the various outcomes that result from 
applying the same copyright law to a wide variety of types of factual works). 
 84 The 1909 Copyright Act protected the “writings of an author.”  By 1976, the definition of 
“writings” had been vastly expanded to include, amongst other things, choreographic 
works and pantomimes, motion pictures, and sculpture.  By the 1990s, the Act was modi-
fied to include architectural design as well.  See supra note 82. 
 85 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 86 See generally Denicola, supra note 10 (discussing, more specifically, the difference in pro-
tection granted to factual compilations and more “literary” works of nonfiction); Gor-
man, supra note 22 (discussing the differences in copyright protection granted to various 
types of factual works). 
 87 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014). 
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tem’s more obscure intricacies—the disparate protections granted to 
works of fiction, factual compilations, and literary works of nonfic-
tion, the treatment of highly speculative works as factual works, and 
the broader protections granted to “soft fact” works like pricing 
guides—similarly point to a copyright system that incentivizes quality 
works.  The very existence of these particularities in our system sug-
gests a judicial understanding, perhaps implicit but nonetheless real, 
that nonfiction must be left open for discussion, verification, and ref-
utation by others. 
A. The Divergent Protection Granted to Factual Compilations and Literary 
Works of Nonfiction 
In our modern copyright system, factual works garner less copy-
right protection than creative and artistic works.  Given the principle 
that one’s copyright only extends to the pieces of the work that the 
author herself has created, this difference in protection makes sense; 
works of fact are necessarily comprised of more pieces that are not 
“original” to the author of the work, but are instead the product of 
the universe itself.88  At the same time, the gap in protection does not 
make sense from a utilitarian standpoint, and has been roundly criti-
cized.  Because the “idea-expression dichotomy”89 stated above—
barring copyright protection from “any idea, procedure, process, sys-
 
 88 Robert Gorman describes this nicely.  See Gorman, supra note 22, at 1570 (“In literary or 
artistic works, the three components of the intellectual product—the ideas, their pattern-
ing, and their ultimate expression—are generally all originated by the author.  While the 
author’s broad ideas must be left in the public domain free for all to use, his patterning 
of those ideas and mode of expression are copyrightable.  As distinguished from literary 
or artistic works, there is a class of publication which involves only the gathering of facts 
or their representation in language or picture . . . . In these works the author’s raw mate-
rials are objective data, and his unique contribution is to gather these facts and to express 
them in language or visual images so ordered as to be intelligible and useful to others.”). 
 89 The idea-expression dichotomy, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), states that “[i]n no case 
does copyright protection . . . extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in [a] work.”  The dichotomy was developed 
in the common law before it was codified.  See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–01, 
103 (1879) (“Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common 
property of the whole world, any author has the right to express the one, or explain the 
use of the other, in his own way. . . .  The copyright of a work on mathematical science 
cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he pro-
pounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an engi-
neer from using them whenever occasion requires.  The very object of publishing a book 
on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which 
it contains.  But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used with-
out incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1000–03 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (denying copyright protection for a daily price-current). 
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tem, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”90—
prevents a comparatively larger percentage of factual works from be-
ing copyrightable,91 factual works therefore will be dis-incentivized in 
relation to creative works. 
And given that works of nonfiction are the types of works that 
should be particularly incentivized,92 the idea-expression dichotomy, 
and its broad application by the courts,93 runs afoul of copyright’s 
underlying purpose. 
At the broadest level, this critique is sound.  Works of nonfiction 
are more “useful” in amassing a body of public knowledge than are 
works of fiction,94 so if we want to maximize the benefits of copyright 
protection promised by the Constitution, we ought to especially in-
centivize works of nonfiction. 
 
 90 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014). 
 91 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), Judge Hand applied 
the idea-expression dichotomy to artistic and creative works through what has since been 
termed the scènes à faire doctrine, withholding copyright protection from commonplace 
“ideas” that one might come to expect to be used in a particular genre.  Even still, a 
threshold must be reached before the scènes à faire doctrine applies; by contrast, the facts 
used in a factual work are never copyrightable.  Indeed, Rocky Balboa and Sylvester Stal-
lone might both be characters, but only one of them can be protected as such in court.  
See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 
1989) (rejecting an infringement claim brought by a fan of the Rocky movies whose man-
uscript for a Rocky sequel was purportedly used by Stallone in his actual Rocky sequel; the 
U.S. district court ruled that the fan himself was the infringer, since Stallone held a copy-
right over the character “Rocky.”  All this despite the fact that the character Rocky is 
probably not too far removed from the real-life human Sylvester Stallone). 
 92 See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 22, at 1583, 1599–1600 (discussing the “social concern for 
the free use and circulation of facts” that fluctuates depending on the topic and type of 
underlying work, and noting by way of example that while “[t]he photographs of the 
model, although reproductions of a ‘fact,’ partake of an artistic conception[,] the photo-
graphs of the medical operation partake more of a representation of facts within the pub-
lic domain, the free dissemination of which is of greater significance to society”). 
 93 Some courts—particularly when dealing with news, historical works of nonfiction, or bi-
ographies—have applied the doctrine broadly.  See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 
1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Decisions such as Hoehling do not come straight from first princi-
ples.  They depend, rather, on the language of what is now 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) . . . . Long 
before the 1976 revision of the statute, courts had decided that historical facts [were] 
among the ‘ideas’ and ‘discoveries’ that the statute does not cover.”); Hoehling v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[W]here, as here, the idea at is-
sue is an interpretation of an historical event, our cases hold that such interpretations are 
not copyrightable as a matter of law.”). 
 94 Works of fiction have utility.  They can spark imagination, induce introspection, broaden 
assumptions, brighten the mood, and teach lessons, amongs other things.  But if we ac-
cept the expansion of human knowledge as the goal of the copyright system, factual 
works have more specific “utility” than works of fiction.  Although we may have accepted a 
broader purpose into our copyright system since 1790, that discussion is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
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But neither this broader critique nor the idea-expression dichot-
omy itself explains the secondary gap in protection that exists be-
tween pure compilations of fact and literary explanations of fact.95  
Assuming a quantity-based rationale, and under the guidance of the 
idea-expression dichotomy, one might expect works of history or bi-
ography to contain more copyrightable substance—such as the au-
thors’ unique embellishments and style—than compilations of facts, 
which often contain no such stylistic additions.  But in reality, literary 
works of nonfiction receive even less protection than pure compila-
tions of facts.96  The “selection and arrangement” of a particular set of 
facts is considered an “original” contribution by an author-compiler97 
that is not recognized in literary works of nonfiction.98  Although this 
 
 95 See Denicola, supra note 10, at 535 (noting that despite the presence of the idea-
expression dichotomy, factual compilations are consistently granted protection for selec-
tion and arrangement of facts while literary works of nonfiction are, paradoxically, not 
granted such protection).  Indeed, some scholars point to simple prevention “of wasted 
effort” as the primary design of the idea-expression dichotomy.  Gorman, supra note 22, 
at 1584 (“[I]t is just this sort of wasted effort which the proscription against the copyright 
of ideas and facts was designed to prevent.”). 
 96 See infra note 97; see also Denicola, supra note 10, at 535 (“A most remarkable feature of 
the judicial response to copyright in factual works is the stubbornly maintained distinc-
tion between pure compilations, such as directories, and writings that present facts 
through textual discussion, such as news reports, treatises, and biographies.  The facts 
appearing in the former, primarily through protection attached to the particular ar-
rangement of data, have consistently enjoyed a significant degree of protection.  Authors 
intent on producing similar compilations have been forced to return to the original 
sources and compile the data anew.  The copyright in works adopting a textual format, 
however, has been notably less effective.  The addition of the requisite number of prepo-
sitions, conjunctions, and verbs has had the paradoxical effect of decreasing the scope of 
protection.”).  Denicola’s assertion includes a minor error:  the addition of new words 
and explanation probably enables an author to inject more originality into a written work 
than she could into a pure compilation.  But his broader point—that factual analyses 
necessarily must follow only a few possible narratives—should not be lost.  There are 
countless ways to list or organize pure facts, but there are less ways to string them into a 
coherent theory.  At any rate, “[t]he law of copyright thus yields the paradoxical result 
that one defendant is rebuked for copying the information contained in a compilation of 
civil war battles and casualties, while another can freely appropriate the results of eight-
een years of research on the death of President Lincoln, which had been published by 
the plaintiff in two copyrighted books.”  Id. at 536 (citations omitted). 
 97 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“These choices 
as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler 
and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may pro-
tect such compilations through the copyright laws.” (citations omitted)). 
 98 Surely, authors of expository works of nonfiction must select and compile facts to support 
their positions.  However, these authors, who generally seek to present a viable theory of 
history, function, biography, or other explanation, typically seek the most credible selec-
tions and arrangements rather than the most original or creative selections and arrange-
ments.  Therefore, even though some theorists have argued that nonfiction authors 
should receive protection for selection and arrangement, see Denicola, supra note 10, at 
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judicially created “selection and arrangement” principle does not go 
against the statutory idea-expression dichotomy, the result that it cre-
ates—less protection for literary works of nonfiction—does. 
So why do courts accept this paradox?  The answer is that a se-
cond consideration—quality, not quantity—influences the amount of 
protection a work will receive.  As was noted in Part I.B, nonfiction 
explanations that are accurate are especially useful to the public body 
of knowledge and the progress of science and useful arts, while non-
fiction explanations that are inaccurate are especially detrimental.  
Compilations of fact, while certainly having some influence on public 
knowledge, do not have the special utility (or disutility) of explana-
tion.99  These pure compilations do not need to be left open for refu-
tation or verification because even if they are copyrighted, another 
compiler can simply rearrange or reconstitute the facts to form a new 
work.100  Although an incorrect listing in a phonebook, for example,101 
would be inconvenient for its users, an incorrect explanation of the 
principles of electromagnetism, frequency and amplitude of sound 
waves, or circuitry, on the other hand, would produce not merely an 
inconvenience, but a faulty understanding of the telephone net-
work—a notable setback from the progress of science that copyright 
is supposed to promote.102 
 
535, 542, courts have not granted such protection.  Finally, in some cases, factual compi-
lations are similarly limited under the merger doctrine.  But while the merger doctrine 
assures that those compilations with a similarly limited array of possible arrangements are 
not copyrighted away from public use, its application is relatively uncommon. 
 99 It is important here to maintain a distinction between pure fact, such as a census count, 
and a factual compilation.  Pure facts are of the utmost importance to our public 
knowledge because they provide the basis for works of nonfiction.  But such facts are not 
copyrightable anyways.  Here, I focus on copyrightable factual compilations, such as 
phone book listings (in some cases), nutrition charts, or a fact book.  Of course, many of 
these examples also include embellishments aside from the pure choice of facts present-
ed.  In this sense, they also include aspects of nonfiction aside from just factual compila-
tion. 
100 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc, v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“The grant of . . . monopoly protection to the original elements of a compila-
tion . . . imposes little cost or disadvantage to society.  The facts set forth in the compila-
tion are not protected and may be freely copied . . . .”). 
101 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 340. 
102 Of course, accurate explanations of a telephone’s functionality already exist, and this is 
why multiple explanations about the same sets of facts and discoveries ought to be en-
couraged.  But this was merely a thematic example.  The more important point is that a 
faulty explanation at the outset of any scientific breakthrough could set the particular in-
dustry or field back by years. 
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There is no bright line dividing compilations of fact from nonfic-
tion explanations.103  A timeline, for example, could include incorrect 
facts and a faulty arrangement of data, which would be just as damag-
ing to public understanding as an incorrect explanation of facts.  But 
such substantive arrangements of fact blur the lines between “pure 
compilations”104 and written nonfiction.  Once a “selection and ar-
rangement” of facts is imbued with explanation of those facts, it takes 
on the role of a teaching tool, seeking the encouragement of learn-
ing for which the American copyright system was established.  Having 
assumed the special utility of a written work of nonfiction, the work 
must then be left open for refutation, verification, or discussion by 
other scholars so that accuracy can be determined and the public 
body of knowledge can advance.  It is for this reason that “texts, trea-
tises, and biographies” receive less protection than “directories” and 
other “pure compilations.”105 
As of yet, no court has acknowledged the special utility of works of 
nonfiction or justified the de facto divide in protection that exists be-
tween the “selection and arrangement” of factual compilations and 
the written explanations of nonfiction.106  Even still, the decisions and 
doctrine issued by the courts can be explained by the theory.  Pure 
compilations of fact are important to the expansion of the public 
body of knowledge because they both add to our volume of infor-
mation and fuel the generation of theories, explanations, and hy-
potheses.  But works of nonfiction are essential both to transforming 
this information into knowledge and understanding and to dispers-
ing it to the public.  If a work of nonfiction truly seeks to explain, 
then its content cannot simply be rearranged without altering its im-
port; as a result, the selection and arrangement of a work of nonfic-
tion becomes an important component that cannot be locked away 
from discussion by copyright protection.  In the pursuit of both quan-
tity and accuracy, not only are works of fact granted less protection 
than works of fiction, but explanatory works of nonfiction are granted 
less protection than pure compilations of fact. 
 
103 See, e.g., Maclean, 44 F.3d at 65–66 (“The protection of compilations is consistent with the 
objectives of the copyright law, which are, as dictated by the Constitution, to promote the 
advancement of knowledge and learning by giving authors economic incentives . . . to la-
bor on creative, knowledge-enriching works . . . . Compilations that devise new and useful 
selections and arrangements of information unquestionably contribute to public 
knowledge by providing cheaper, easier, and better organized access to information.”). 
104 See Denicola, supra note 10, at 535. 
105 Id. (referring to judicial treatment of nonfiction copyright law as a “stubbornly main-
tained distinction”). 
106 See infra Part IV.C. 
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B. The Treatment of Highly Speculative Works As Factual Works 
Regardless of the selection and arrangement of the pieces of fact 
that they use, works of nonfiction still contain stylistic devices that do 
not exist in pure compilations.  For that reason, a theory of copyright 
based solely on the idea-expression dichotomy would also predict that 
expository works garner increased protection, even without the add-
ed layer given to the “selection and arrangement” of facts.  Many 
courts, however, have eschewed this result, withholding copyright 
protection from the theories, accounts, or hypotheses that authors 
have generated to explain particular facts, even if those theories or 
hypotheses are novel.107  Such “speculative” works, as at least one 
court has termed them, are treated as an extension of the “facts” that 
they seek to explain.108  This treatment of speculative works provides 
the strongest evidence of an underlying need for discussion, verifica-
tion, and refutation, and the accurate works of nonfiction that result.  
Likewise, it lends credence to the alternative theory of copyright utili-
ty presented in this Comment. 
The notion that the speculative aspects of nonfiction cannot be 
copyrighted has developed gradually over the past century just as 
copyrightable subject matter has expanded.  In 1918, the Supreme 
Court ruled in International News Service v. Associated Press109 that “the 
news element . . . is not the creation of the writer,” and therefore 
cannot be copyrighted.110  Twenty years later in Oxford Book Co. v. Col-
lege Entrance Book Co.,111 the Second Circuit rejected copyright protec-
tion for historical information—even if that information was inaccu-
rate—noting that “historical facts are not copyrightable per se nor are 
errors in fact.”112  Modern courts have denied protection not only to 
facts, discoveries, and ideas, but also to purported facts, hypotheses, 
 
107 See infra text accompanying notes 110–116; see also Denicola, supra note 10, at 535 (discuss-
ing the courts’ limited granting of copyright protection to works of historical nonfiction); 
Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 647 (also noting the weak protections granted by the Hoehling 
court); Gorman, supra note 10, at 588 (noting the relative weakness in protection afford-
ed to the work in question in Hoehling, discussed infra text accompanying notes 118–119). 
108 This conclusion has largely resulted from a broad interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  
See infra text accompanying notes 126–127. 
109 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  Justice Louis Brandeis, of course, dissented and quipped that “[n]o 
question of statutory copyright is involved.”  Id. at 249 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 234. 
111 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938). 
112 Id. at 691.  The court continued to state, “The plaintiff’s book was designed to convey in-
formation to the reader.  The defendant authors were as free to read it . . . and to acquire 
from it such information as they could . . . [or] such misinformation as it contained.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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and theories.113  In Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,114 the Second 
Circuit held that “the protection afforded the copyright holder has 
never extended to history, be it documented fact or explanatory hy-
pothesis.”115  In Nash v. CBS, Inc.,116 the Seventh Circuit likewise found 
that “speculative works representing themselves as fact” were subject 
to the same copyright limitations as purely factual works.117 
These decisions fall neatly in line with the pursuit of accuracy in 
nonfiction works.  “Speculative works” are precisely those works that 
could be valuable or detrimental to the “progress of science [or] use-
ful arts,” but the accuracy of which is unknown.  As such, they are the 
types of works whose propositions should be left uncovered by copy-
right protection so that other scholars or theorists can discuss the 
merits of the claims made and explanations given.  In her article The 
Marketplace of Ideas and the Idea-Expression Distinction of Copyright Law, 
Patricia Loughlan discussed the inadequacy of the “idea-expression 
distinction,” Australia’s version of the idea-expression dichotomy, as a 
stimulant for the “marketplace of ideas.”118  Loughlan pointed out 
 
113 See, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (“[Plaintiff] could not acquire by copyright a monopoly in 
the narration of historical events.”).  Cf. Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666 (7th 
Cir. 1950) (finding copyright infringement where defendant largely appropriated the his-
torical biographical facts concerning Hans Christian Andersen’s life that plaintiff had 
amassed through years of research). 
114 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
115 Id. at 974; see also id. (“Accordingly, the scope of copyright in historical accounts is narrow 
indeed, embracing no more than the author’s original expression of particular facts and 
theories already in the public domain.”). 
116 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990). 
117 Id. at 1541–42.  The court refused to bar the defendant from using the plaintiff’s unique 
interpretation of a historical event in creating a television show adopting that interpreta-
tion.  Id.  But while the Nash court largely cited Hoehling throughout its opinion, it was 
cautious not to accept the Hoehling ruling outright:   
Hoehling rejected [our opinion in] Toksvig . . . concluding that ‘[k]nowledge is ex-
panded . . . by granting new authors of historical works a relatively free hand to 
build upon the work of their predecessors.’  . . . With respect for our colleagues of 
the east, we think this goes to the extreme of looking at incentives only ex post.  
The authors in Hoehling and Toksvig spent years tracking down leads.  If all of their 
work, right down to their words, may be used without compensation, there will be 
too few original investigations, and facts will not be available on which to build. 
  Id. at 1542 (emphasis in original) (citation of Hoehling omitted).  Of course, Toksvig was a 
Seventh Circuit decision, and the Nash court still emphasizes that the end sought is incen-
tivizing the production of knowledge. 
118 Patricia Loughlan, The Marketplace of Ideas and the Idea-Expression Distinction of Copyright 
Law, 23 ADEL. L. REV. 29, 30 (2002).  I should note that Loughlan most likely ascribes to 
the “democratic paradigm” justification of copyright,  eloquently described by Neil Wein-
stock Netanel, whereby copyright serves as “an ‘engine of free expression’” that “foster[s] 
a vibrant and participatory civil society.”  Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Demo-
cratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 341 (1996)(citations omitted).  It is beyond the scope 
of this Comment to discuss the underlying justification for having a copyright system at 
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that “the social discovery of truth” required more than simply a free 
flow of facts; it required a free flow of theories too.119  Although 
Loughlan took issue with the breadth of interpretation given to the 
idea-expression dichotomy itself, her insights largely mirror those 
that have been, at least in passing, touched upon by courts in the 
United States.  In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 
for example, the Supreme Court noted that the dichotomy “strike[s] 
a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copy-
right Act . . . .”120  That observation is consistent with the notion that 
society has an interest in discussing, verifying, or refuting works of 
nonfiction. 
Of course, the Nash and Hoehling courts shirked any such explana-
tion, blaming Congress for their decisions.  Pointing to the 1976 
Copyright Act, the Seventh Circuit stated in Nash that “[d]ecisions 
such as Hoehling do not come straight from first principles.  They de-
pend, rather, on the language of what is now 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) . . . . 
Long before the 1976 revision . . . , courts had decided that historical 
facts [were] among the ‘ideas’ and ‘discoveries’ that the statute does 
not cover.”121  For its part, the Second Circuit in Hoehling had de-
clared that “where, as here, the idea at issue is an interpretation of an 
historical event, our cases hold that such interpretations are not cop-
yrightable as a matter of law.”122  Rather than explaining why such in-
terpretations or other “speculative works representing themselves as 
 
all.  And in any event, no matter what justification is best, the system ascribed by the 
Framers of the Constitution is bolstered by a view of copyright utility that considers accu-
racy alongside quantity. 
119 Loughlan’s article focused on three aspects of “freedom of speech,” one of which was a 
“marketplace of ideas” within which “truth is discovered and disseminated.”  Loughlan, 
supra note 118, at 29.  Said Loughlan, “Copyright law, in current theory and doctrine, 
protects against considerably more than just literal copying and the extent to which it 
goes beyond protecting literal copying is the exact extent to which it encroaches upon 
the sphere of ideas and takes them out of free public circulation.”  Id. at 31.  While 
Loughlan does not explicitly advocate for the expansion of the idea-expression dichoto-
my beyond the realm of an “idea,” she does advocate for a more expansive interpretation 
of what an “idea” is.  Nevertheless, Loughlan’s premise that “the discovery or possibly the 
construction of truth is dependent upon the free creation, dissemination, and competi-
tion of ideas,” id., supports the conclusion that theories should also be kept free for dis-
cussion by other scholars. 
120 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (alterations in original) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)) (quoted in Loughlan, supra note 118, 
at 33). 
121 Nash, 899 F.2d at 1542. 
122 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980). 
1544 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
fact”123 should not be copyrighted, the courts found it easier to point 
to a strict interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).124 
It is likely that these courts were simply deflecting attention away 
from the substantive judgments that they were making about the re-
spective works in question.  Courts have long since shed any role as 
“final judges of the worth of” an authored work125—a maxim still fol-
lowed today.126  At the same time, barring copyright protection to an 
explanation of fact because it is “speculative” necessarily requires a 
judgment of that work’s value to the progress of science or useful 
arts; indeed, the term “speculative work” implies such a judgment.127  
Moreover, both courts made it clear that the respective works’ 
presentation as works of “fact” were an important factor in determin-
ing the scope of copyright protection.128  The courts were careful not 
 
123 Nash, 899 F.2d at 1541. 
124 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.” (emphasis added)). 
125 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
126 See, e.g., Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, 691 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“The district court apparently was of the view that, because the drawings were architec-
tural, something more was required for their copyright protection.  It is black-letter law, 
however, that courts accept as protected ‘any work which by the most generous standard 
may arguably be said to evince creativity.’  Justice Holmes explained more than a century 
ago that ‘[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations.’” (citations 
omitted)).  But see Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding, af-
ter an extensive analysis of each painting’s “transformative” nature, that twenty-five out of 
the defendant’s thirty appropriation pieces were exempted from infringement by the fair 
use defense).  Of course, a fair use analysis requires somewhat extensive judicial judg-
ment by necessity.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (requiring that any judicial fair use analysis consid-
er four separate factors as laid out by statute). 
127 Just because a value judgment is required to categorize a work as “speculative,” however, 
does not mean that such value judgments are necessary to uphold the alternative under-
standing proposed by this Comment on a larger scale.  For example, whether the particu-
lar theory at hand was or was not “speculative” was not a discussion that the Hoehling court 
ever reached.  Rather, that court barred protection for any hypothesis or theory of histo-
ry.  Hoehing, 618 F.2d at 978.  And while the Nash court characterized the work at hand as 
“speculative,” it too imposed what it considered to be a blanket prohibition against the 
copyrighting of theories and explanations.  Nash, 899 F.2d at 1541–43.  Likewise, the the-
ory that I have proposed in this paper requires no categorizations either.  Any theory 
should always be open to refutation by a new explanation.  So by treating “speculative” or 
unverified explanations as “facts,” these courts have effectively imposed the blanket bar 
on copyright of theories and hypotheses that the special utility of nonfiction recom-
mends.  They have lent credence to the idea that accuracy, and not just quantity in and of 
itself, is a factor that makes works of nonfiction useful for the purpose given to the copy-
right system by the Constitution. 
128 Both the Nash and the Hoehling decisions touched upon the importance of knowledge 
and truth as goals that could be realized with the development of multiple different non-
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to admit to any value judgments, and since the Nash case, courts have 
continued to remain vague in explaining why copyright cannot ex-
tend to facts and ideas.129  But want for clear explanations notwith-
standing, these cases have continued to bar copyright protection for 
ideas, hypotheses, or other speculative works.130 
C. Addressing the Inconsistencies in Case Law 
While many “speculative” works have been treated like facts by var-
ious courts—and left open for discussion, verification, or refutation—
not all theories and hypotheses have been withheld copyright protec-
tion.  For example, copyrights for some types of statistical calculations 
and estimates have been held enforceable, even though they are es-
sentially speculative in nature.  In CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Mac-
lean Hunter Market Reports, Inc.,131 the Second Circuit ruled that the 
Red Book, a used car pricing compendium published by Maclean 
Hunter, was not the sort of compilation of informational matter sub-
ject to the thin “selection and arrangement” protection granted in 
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.132  And in Kregos v. Associ-
ated Press (Kregos IV),133 the Second Circuit accorded limited copyright 
protection to a set of baseball statistics, though it declined to find that 
 
fiction theories regarding a particular fact.  The Hoehling court, identifying “knowledge” 
as the “cause” that the copyright system embraces, acknowledged that learning was not 
being enhanced if one author controlled the explanation and presentation of a given 
fact, Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974; “[t]o avoid a chilling effect on authors who contemplate 
tacking an historical issue or event, broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors 
who make use of historical subject matter, including theories or plots.”  Id. at 978.  And 
the Nash court understood the special utility cloaking any work claiming to be informa-
tive:  Though the plaintiff’s “reconstruction of the . . . story has not won adherents among 
historians,” Nash, 899 F.2d at 1538, because the plaintiff did “not portray [his work] and 
its companion works as fiction . . . which makes all the difference,” his ideas and historical 
conclusions are not copyrightable.”  Id. at 1541 (emphasis added).  However, though the-
se courts supported the notion of a higher volume of nonfiction works, they never explic-
itly took the extra step in supporting a higher quality of nonfiction works. 
129 Typical is New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 
110–13 (2d Cir. 2007), in which the Second Circuit, while citing the intellectual property 
clause of the Constitution, ruled that the New York Mercantile Exchange’s settlement 
prices, which are used to value its customers’ positions, were not copyrightable because 
“enforcing the copyright . . . would effectively accord protection to the idea itself.” 
130 Id. 
131 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). 
132 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).  The 
Maclean court overruled the district court, which had held that the book was “nothing 
more than a compilation of unprotected facts, selected and organized without originality 
and creativity.”  CCC Info. Servs., Inc, v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 64–65 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
133 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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the defendant had infringed on those statistics.134  These cases seem-
ingly contradict the idea that explanations and interpretations of fact 
must be foreclosed from copyright protection. 
But in both of these cases—and taking Maclean as an example—
the Second Circuit distinguished between “those ideas that undertake 
to advance the understanding of phenomena or the solution of prob-
lems . . . and those . . . that do not undertake to explain phenomena 
or furnish solutions, but are infused with the author’s taste or opin-
ion.”135  In Maclean, the court found that because the estimates con-
tained in the Red Book were of the latter “soft type” of idea, they were 
excepted from the idea-expression dichotomy and the merger doc-
trine as a matter of policy.136  Because “[t]he valuation figures given in 
the Red Book [were] not historical market prices, quotations, or aver-
ages[, and were] not derived by mathematical formulas from availa-
ble statistics” 137—facts of the essential “building-block[] category”138—
but were instead merely “editors’ predictions,” it was not necessary to 
foreclose them from copyright protection. 
In distinguishing between theories and “soft” ideas, the Maclean 
court was making a constitutional statement.  “[I]deas,” said the 
court, “are too important to the advancement of knowledge to permit 
them to be under private ownership, and . . . open public debate, 
which is essential to a free democratic society, requires free access to 
the ideas to be debated.”139  But the Red Book was just a book of pric-
ing estimates.  It was not a compilation of facts or ideas, or a work of 
explanatory nonfiction, and did not need to be copied to be dis-
cussed, verified, or refuted.  By identifying an inherent difference in 
“usefulness” between works that seek to explain phenomena and 
works that seemingly produce their own “facts” that are “infused with 
the author’s taste and opinion,”140 the court recognized that some 
works can still be discussed and verified while being copyrighted.  
The Red Book itself cautioned in its introduction that “[y]ou, the sub-
scriber, must be the final judge of the actual value of a particular ve-
hicle,” foregoing any assertion that its contents were authoritative as 
 
134 Id. at 663 (holding that a factual compilation capable of being expressed only in a limited 
number of ways is afforded only limited protection (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 349). 
135 Maclean, 44 F.3d at 71 (citing Kregos v. Associated Press (Kregos II), 937 F.2d 700, 707 
(2d Cir. 1991)). 
136 Id. at 63. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 71. 
139 Id. at 69 (citing MELVILLE NIMMER, 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B]. 
140 Id. at 72. 
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to automobile pricing.141  And any competing automobile pricing 
guides would likely employ varied computational equations anyways, 
rendering them distinguishable from the Red Book. 
Of course, this reasoning cannot apply to all pricing guides or sta-
tistical calculations, many of which surely use data in a manner that 
would foreclose a determination of accuracy by other scholars if given 
copyright protection.142  Nonetheless, cases like Maclean, which have 
granted protection to pricing and statistical estimates that are certain-
ly “speculative” works, do not damage the distinctive utility of nonfic-
tion works.  The Second Circuit recognized the importance of discus-
sion, verification, and refutation to the process of developing an 
accurate body of knowledge.  Its decision in Maclean to withhold ap-
plication of that maxim to works that do not need to be copied to be 
studied by others does not undercut this understanding. 
CONCLUSION 
Although works of nonfiction are especially important to the goals 
of knowledge, science, and useful art envisioned by our country’s 
Founding Fathers, they garner less protection under copyright than 
do creative and artistic works.  In his 1963 article Copyright Protection 
for the Compilation and Representation of Facts, Robert Gorman took note 
of this paradox, observing that “courts ha[d] put into practice, with-
out articulation, the distinction between works of literary or artistic 
merit and fact works,” recognizing a distinction in utility and need for 
public dissemination between the two.143  Since then, opinions such as 
Hoehling and Nash, as well as an increased prominence of the fair use 
defense, have indicated that the courts are “put[ting] into practice, 
without articulation,” another distinction between various types of 
copyrighted works.  In accordance with the need to produce accu-
rate, and not just numerous, works, courts are differentiating be-
tween works which require discussion, verification, and refutation to 
attain accuracy and works that do not. 
Although such a distinction might skew the simple incentive struc-
ture we typically ascribe to copyright—the more works that are incen-
tivized, the better—it actually upholds a key purpose outlined by the 
 
141 Id. at 63 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
142 See, e.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 110 
(2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the New York Mercantile Exchange’s settlement prices, 
which are used to value its customers’ positions, were not copyrightable because “enforc-
ing the copyright . . . would effectively accord protection to the idea itself”). 
143 Gorman, supra note 22, at 1599. 
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Constitution.  The American copyright system is tasked with promot-
ing the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”144  Copyright does not 
exist to protect one’s natural right in her intellectual creations; ra-
ther, it serves as a tool to incentivize the creation and expansion of 
societal knowledge and understanding.145  The first Congress saw cop-
yright as a means by which to encourage learning,146 and this public 
benefit rationale continues to be cited by courts today.147 
The intricacies that exist in today’s copyright system indicate that 
the courts, even as they have given Congress broad deference as to 
the extent of its Section 8 Clause 8 powers, have not lost sight of this  
purpose.  That expository works of nonfiction have oftentimes gar-
nered less copyright protection than mere compilations of facts, even 
though such expository works often require significantly more time 
and rigorous thought to complete, that so-called “speculative” works 
may get lesser protection than other works, and that works that are 
more clearly the product of opinion and subjective categorization—
such as used car price estimates—may get more protection are all 
pieces of our copyright system that begin to make sense under a mul-
tidimensional understanding of utility. 
Works of nonfiction—originally targeted, not merely coincidental-
ly, for copyright protection—have a special ability to contribute to the 
copyright system.  Because they are created with the intent of produc-
ing information or understanding, works of nonfiction are unques-
tionably useful in contributing towards the public body of 
knowledge—but only if they are accurate.  While accurate works 
bring society closer to discovering the truth regarding various phe-
nomena and human questions such as history, inaccurate works of 
nonfiction can be especially harmful to the public body of knowledge.  
Our copyright system must therefore encourage not just a greater 
quantity of nonfiction works, but also a higher quality of nonfiction 
works.  Nonfiction explanations and hypotheses—the accuracy of 
which matters to our public body of knowledge—must be left open 
for verification, refutation, and inclusion in scholarly discourse. 
 
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
145 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 21 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds. 1958) (“[A]s encouragements to literary 
works and ingenious discoveries, [copyrights] are . . . too valuable to be wholly re-
nounced.”). 
146 Copyright Act of 1790, supra note 23. 
147 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyz-
ing an infringement’s fair use in terms of its “transformative use” and “benefit to the pub-
lic”). 
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Questions, of course, remain unanswered.  How can a new under-
standing of copyright utility be more uniformly incorporated into the 
copyright system?  If the answer is that hypotheses and theories be 
left without copyright protection—as has been suggested here—how 
can such a ban be squared with a system that is meant, at bottom, to 
incentivize the production of those very works? 
Copyright scholars have addressed this issue, coming to various 
conclusions.  One solution, offered by Robert Gorman and supported 
by others, calls for increasing the breadth of copyright protection 
granted to such works of nonfiction while also allowing scholars to 
more easily claim fair use when discussing, critiquing, or verifying 
such works.148  This solution is attractive because it keeps the incentive 
structure in place and forces judges reviewing cases of infringement 
into a relatively extensive analysis of the works.  Its detracting factor is 
that increased judicial involvement in infringement analyses may lead 
to conflicting results, and increased reliance on fair use will lead to 
increased litigation (though it could fall again once best practices are 
developed).  Another solution, offered by Jane Ginsburg, also calls 
for permitting broad protection of literary works of nonfiction, with 
the extent of that protection determined by a court-imposed abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison test.  This “test”149 also keeps the incentive 
structure in place, and acknowledges that society can gradually come 
to a consensus regarding a particular phenomenon or fact pattern, 
allowing a contraction of the “levels” of abstraction regarding a par-
ticular topic.  But it also makes way for broad judicial discretion in 
determining when a consensus has been reached—when the “truth” 
has been found—and how a particular topic ought to be defined, 
which is dangerous if we want judges to remain neutral regarding the 
accuracy or veracity of a particular work. 
Particular factors make it difficult to support one solution over 
another.150  But no matter which course is eventually chosen, it seems 
 
148 Gorman, supra note 22, at 1603 (advocating that courts grant copyright protection by 
“find[ing] ‘originality’ in the social contribution made by the accurate gathering, verifica-
tion, and tangible representation of useful information” in factual works, and then per-
mitting extensive use of such works by “compel[ling] courts to resolve the prob-
lems . . . under the rubric of infringement and fair use . . . .”). 
149 To be clear, “[Judge] Hand’s insight is not a ‘test’ at all.  It is a clever way to pose the dif-
ficulties that require courts to avoid either extreme of the continuum of generality,” Nash 
v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990), upon which the framing of a topic or is-
sue can fall. 
150 Broadly speaking, it is unclear whether stronger copyright protection will result in an in-
creased production of nonfiction works.  Other factors, such as economic first-mover ad-
vantage, prestige, the possibility of career advancement and recognition, and personal 
motives, surely influence the decision to author an explanatory work of nonfiction.  At 
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as though the courts will have to continue balancing both incentive 
against dissemination and quantity against quality.  The status quo 
use of the idea-expression dichotomy does not guarantee that the ac-
curacy of nonfiction will be considered by courts when determining 
how to construe the protection of such works.  Instead, courts must 
take care in how broadly or narrowly they define the underlying idea 
or fact being excluded from protection—and this is precisely what 
the courts have done in cases like Hoehling and Nash.  In the end, no 
matter what standards the courts use, they ought to make these fac-
tors known.  In striking a balance between incentive and dissemina-
tion, courts must bear in mind that a third consideration exists—the 
accuracy of the explanatory works being submitted to the public body 
of knowledge.  If we are to support the Constitution’s goals of pro-
gress in science and useful arts, such works must be subject to discus-
sion, verification, and refutation so as to ensure accuracy of under-
standing.  And even if a judicial hand in constructing our public body 
of knowledge is inevitable, judges ought to at least be aware of—and 
ultimately acknowledge—all the cards on the table. 
 
 
the same time, it is unclear whether a bar to protecting theories and hypotheses would 
depress incentives enough to result in fewer works.  Judge Easterbrook feared as much in 
Nash:  “If all of [an author’s] work, right down to [her] words, may be used without com-
pensation, there will be too few original investigations, and facts will not be available on 
which to build.”  Id. at 1542.  Likewise, it is unclear if such a bar would actually result in 
the increased dialogue needed to determine a work’s accuracy. 
   In any event, it seems as if judicial involvement in making those determinations is 
inevitable.  Said Judge Easterbrook in Nash, the copyright system, as a legal institution, 
must be able to find the right balance between incentivizing new works through strong 
copyright protection and enablement of discourse about nonfiction works through more 
limited protection.   
   After 200 years of wrestling with copyright questions, it is unlikely that courts will 
come up with the answer any time soon, if indeed there is ‘an’ answer, which we 
doubt . . . .  [O]pposing forces . . . make the formulation of a single approach [very] diffi-
cult. . . .  Before the first work is published, broad protection . . . seems best; after it is 
published, narrow protection seems best.  At each instant some new works are in pro-
gress, and every author is simultaneously a creator in part and a borrower in part.  In the-
se roles, the same person has different objectives.  Yet only one rule can be in force. Id. at 
1540–41. 
